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Abstract
We consider a generalisation of the Stable Roommates problem (sr), in which
preference lists may be partially ordered and forbidden pairs may be present, denoted
by srpf. This includes, as a special case, a corresponding generalisation of the classical
Stable Marriage problem (sm), denoted by smpf. By extending previous work of
Feder, we give a two-step reduction from srpf to 2-sat. This has many consequences,
including fast algorithms for a range of problems associated with nding \optimal"
stable matchings and listing all solutions, given variants of sr and sm. For example,
given an smpf instance I , we show that there exists an O(m) \succinct" certicate
for the unsolvability of I , an O(m) algorithm for nding all the super-stable pairs in
I , an O(m + kn) algorithm for listing all the super-stable matchings in I , an O(m1:5)
algorithm for nding an egalitarian super-stable matching in I , and an O(m) algorithm
for nding a minimum regret super-stable matching in I , where n is the number of
men, m is the total length of the preference lists, and k is the number of super-stable
matchings in I . Analogous results apply in the case of srpf.
Keywords: Stable Roommates problem; Stable marriage problem; Partial order; Forbid-
den pair; Super-stable matching
1 Introduction
The Stable Roommates problem (sr) is a classical combinatorial problem that has received
much attention in the literature [8, 19, 13, 11, 28, 17]. Gale and Shapley [8] were the rst to
study sr and dened an instance I to comprise n agents, where n is even, each of whom
ranks the others in strict order of preference. A matching in I is a set of n=2 disjoint
(unordered) pairs of agents. A matching M is stable if there is no pair of agents fai; ajg,
each of whom prefers the other to his partner in M . Such a pair is said to block M , or
to be a blocking pair with respect to M . A blocking pair represents a situation in which
Supported by the Janos Bolyai Research Fellowship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, and OTKA
grant F 037301 of the Hungarian Scientic Research Fund. Part of this work was carried out during a
visit to the Department of Computing Science, University of Glasgow, supported by the Royal Society of
Edinburgh International Exchange Programme.
ySupported by Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council grant EP/E011993/1.
zSupported by Royal Society of Edinburgh / Scottish Executive Personal Research Fellowship, and En-
gineering and Physical Sciences Research Council grant GR/R84597/01. Part of this work was carried out
during a visit to the Egervary Research Group on Combinatorial Optimization, Department of Operations
Research, Eotvos Lorand University.
1
the two agents involved would rather disregard their partners in M and become matched
to each other, undermining the integrity of M . Gale and Shapley [8] showed that an sr
instance need not admit a stable matching. Irving [13] solved a problem posed by Knuth
[19] when he described an O(n2) algorithm { linear in the input size { that nds a stable
matching or reports that none exists, for a given instance of sr.
As the problem name suggests, an application of sr arises in the context of campus
accommodation allocation, where we seek to assign students to share two-person rooms,
based on their preferences over one another. Another application occurs in the context
of forming pairings of players for chess tournaments [20]. Very recently, a more serious
application of sr has been studied, involving pairwise kidney exchange between incom-
patible patient-donor pairs [27]. Here, preference lists can be constructed on the basis of
compatibility proles between potential donors and existing patients.
sr is a non-bipartite extension of the classical Stable Marriage problem (sm) [8]. In an
sm instance, the set of agents is partitioned into two disjoint sets, the men and women,
each of size n=2, and each person ranks all members of the opposite sex in strict order
of preference. A matching is a set of n=2 disjoint (man,woman) pairs, whilst a blocking
pair is a (man,woman) pair, each of whom prefers the other to his/her partner in M .
Every instance of sm admits at least one stable matching, and such a matching may be
found in O(n2) time using the Gale/Shapley algorithm [8]. sm and its many-one variant
(the Hospitals / Residents problem or College Admissions problem [8, 11]) arise in many
practical applications, such as the annual match of graduating medical students to hospital
posts in a number of countries [26]. Furthermore sm is a special case of sr: given an sm
instance I, we may construct in O(n2) time an sr instance J such that the stable matchings
in I are in 1-1 correspondence with the stable matchings in J [11, Lemma 4.1.1].
Incomplete preference lists
sr may be generalised by allowing the preference lists of those involved to be incomplete.
In this case, we say that agent p is acceptable to agent q if p appears on the preference
list of q, and unacceptable otherwise. Also we need not insist that n is even. Such a
generalisation of the original sr denition has been referred to in the literature as sri
(Stable Roommates with Incomplete lists) [17], though for convenience, in this paper from
this point onwards, each use of the term sr or sm refers to the more general problem
model that includes the possibility of incomplete lists.
In this context, a matching M must satisfy the property that fai; ajg 2 M implies that
ai; aj nd each other acceptable. We also revise the denition of stability as follows: a pair
of mutually acceptable agents fai; ajg is a blocking pair of M if each is either unmatched
in M or prefers the other to his partner in M . (It follows that, from the point of view of
nding stable matchings, we may assume without loss of generality that p is acceptable
to q if and only if q is acceptable to p.) Note that this denition assumes that an agent
would prefer to be matched to an acceptable partner rather than to remain unmatched.
A stable matching for an instance of sr need not be a complete matching. However,
all stable matchings for a given instance have the same size and match exactly the same
set of agents [11, Theorem 4.5.2]. It is straightforward (see [11, Section 4.5.2]) to extend
Irving's algorithm [13] to give an O(m) algorithm that nds a stable matching or reports
that none exists, given an sr instance I (with possibly incomplete lists), where m is the
total length of the preference lists in I.
Indierence in the preference lists
Another natural generalisation of sr arises when agents are permitted to express indier-
ence in their preference lists. Partially ordered preference lists (referred to as preference
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posets) allow for the most general form of indierence. We let srp denote the extension
of sr in which preference lists are partially ordered. A special case of srp arises when
indierence takes the form of ties in the preferences lists (i.e. the relation \is indierent
between" is transitive) { we refer to this restriction as srt (Stable Roommates with Ties).
Three stability criteria have been dened in the context of the Stable Marriage problem
with Ties (henceforth smt) [15] and these denitions have been generalised to srp [17].
Under the weakest of these three, a matching M in an srp instance I is weakly stable if
there is no pair of mutually acceptable agents fai; ajg, each of whom is either unmatched
in M or prefers the other to his partner in M . Ronn [25] showed that the problem of
deciding whether an srt instance I admits a weakly stable matching is NP-complete,
even if I contains no incomplete lists, each list has at most one tie, and each tie is of
length 2. Irving and Manlove [17] gave a shorter proof of this result, for the same problem
restrictions. For the smt case, it is known that weakly stable matchings must exist but
can be of dierent sizes, and each of the problems of nding a maximum or minimum
weakly stable matching is NP-hard, for similar restrictions on the positions and lengths
of ties [23].
According to the strongest of the three stability criteria, a matching M in an srp
instance I is super-stable if there is no pair of mutually acceptable agents fai; ajg, each
of whom is either unmatched or prefers the other to his partner in M or is indierent
between them. The following proposition, whose proof is straightforward and is omitted,
gives a necessary and sucient condition for M to be super-stable in I.
Proposition 1.1. Let M be a matching in an instance I of srp. Then M is super-stable
in I if and only if M is stable in every instance of sr obtainable by creating a linear
extension of each preference poset in I.
A super-stable matching need not exist, given an instance of smt [15]. However Irving
and Manlove [17] gave an O(m) algorithm, Algorithm srt-super, that nds a super-stable
matching in an srt instance I or reports that none exists. They also indicated how to
generalise this algorithm to the case that I is an instance of srp. Algorithm srt-super
is an extension of Phase 1 of Irving's algorithm for sr [13], and an algorithm that nds
a super-stable matching or reports that none exists, given an instance of smt [15]. It is
also known that, for a given srp instance I, the same set of agents are matched in all
super-stable matchings in I [17].
A third form of stability that lies \in between" weak stability and super-stability is
strong stability. A matching M in an srp instance I is strongly stable if there is no pair
of mutually acceptable agents fai; ajg, such that ai is either unmatched in M or prefers
aj to his partner in M , and aj is either unmatched in M or prefers ai to his partner
in M or is indierent between them. Again a strongly stable matching need not exist,
given an instance of smt [15]. Clearly a super-stable matching is strongly stable, and
a strongly stable matching is weakly stable. Scott [29] gave an O(m2) algorithm that
nds a strongly stable matching in I or reports that none exists, if I is an instance of
srt. This algorithm is an extension of Algorithm srt-super [17], and an algorithm that
nds a strongly stable matching or reports that none exists, given an instance of smt [15].
However the problem of deciding whether an instance I of srp admits a strongly stable
matching is NP-complete [18] (this result holds even if I is an instance of smp, i.e. sm
with partially ordered preference lists).
The most natural form of indierence arises when preference posets can be expressed
in terms of ties. However Fishburn [7] discusses practical situations in which more gen-
eral preference structures, including arbitrary partial orders, may be appropriate. One
particular scenario in which super-stability in the context of srp or smp is relevant is
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when there is uncertainty in the preference structures. Suppose that, in an sr instance,
we wish to nd a stable matching, but for some or all of the agents we have only partial
information regarding preferences. In general, each preference \list" may be expressible
only as a partial order, and the particular linear extension that represents an agent's true
preferences is unknown. Therefore in view of Proposition 1.1, a super-stable matching is
one that is stable no matter which linear extensions of the preference posets represent the
true preferences.
Forbidden pairs
Recently Dias et al. [2] introduced the concept of forbidden pairs to an instance I of sm.
A set of forbidden pairs is a set F of (man,woman) pairs, none of which is permitted to
belong to any stable matching in I. That is, a matching M is stable if M admits no
blocking pair, and M \ F = ;. Note that forbidden pairs can be blocking pairs, so they
cannot simply be declared as unacceptable partners. We denote by smf the generalisation
of sm in which an instance may contain forbidden pairs. One motivation for considering
smf is that an administrator of a centralised matching scheme may, for whatever reason,
wish to prevent a particular pairing from being returned in a constructed matching M .
However the agents concerned may nevertheless wish to become matched to one another,
so could potentially form a blocking pair and therefore undermine M . Dias et al. [2]
gave an O(m) algorithm that nds a stable matching or reports that none exists, given
an instance of smf.1 Clearly the notion of forbidden pairs may be applied to the other
stable matching problems smp, sr and srp considered here, giving smpf, srf and srpf
respectively (with analogous extensions when indierence takes the form of ties).
Contribution of this paper
Let I be an instance of smpf. In this paper we establish the following results:
1. an O(m) algorithm to nd a \succinct certicate", using O(n) space, for the unsolv-
ability (i.e. the non-existence of a super-stable matching) of I;
2. an O(m) algorithm to nd a super-stable matching in I or report that none exists;
3. an O(m) algorithm to nd a minimum regret super-stable matching in I { this is a
super-stable matching that minimises the maximum rank of an agent's partner;
4. an O(m1:5) algorithm to nd an egalitarian super-stable matching in I { this is a
super-stable matching that minimises the sum of the ranks of the agents' partners;
5. an O(m) algorithm to nd all the super-stable pairs (i.e. all the pairs that belong to
some super-stable matching) in I;
6. an algorithm to list all the super-stable matchings in I: the rst super-stable match-
ing can be output in O(m) time, and each subsequent super-stable matching can be
output in O(n) time.
We also extend the algorithms under Items 1-3 and 5-6 to the case that I is an instance of
srpf. In this case, the complexity of the algorithms for each of Items 1-3 and 5 changes
to O(nm), as does the complexity of generating the rst super-stable matching in the case
of Item 6.
1Dias et al. [2] considered the version of sm where there are no incomplete lists, however it is straight-
forward to extend their results to the case of incomplete lists.
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Our results are established via a two-step reduction from srpf under super-stability to
2-sat. The rst reduction shows that an instance I of srpf may be transformed in O(nm)
time to an instance J of srf, with the property that the super-stable matchings in I are
in 1-1 correspondence with the stable matchings in J . This reduction may be carried out
in O(m) time if I is an instance of smpf. The second reduction extends earlier work of
Feder [5, 6], who showed that an sr instance J may be transformed in O(m) time to an
instance K of 2-sat, such that the stable matchings in J are in 1-1 correspondence with
the satisfying truth assignments for K. Here we extend this reduction to the case that J
is an instance of srf. In this setting, K may be constructed from J in O(nm) time; the
complexity improves to O(m) if J is an instance of smf. The aforementioned reduction
from an instance I of srpf to an instance J of srf holds in particular if I is an instance
of srt. We give a third reduction, in the opposite direction, showing that the problem of
nding a super-stable matching, given an instance of srt, is polynomial-time equivalent
to the problem of nding a stable matching, given an instance of srf.
Previous work
Conway (see Knuth [19]), Irving and Leather [16] and Feder [5, 6] established some im-
portant structural properties relating to stable matchings in an sm instance, leading to
a number of ecient algorithms for the problems listed under Items 3-6 for the sm case,
without altering the time complexities [9, 6]. Moreover both the algorithms for Items 5 and
6 have been extended to the smf case [2], again without change to the time complexities.
Similarly Guseld [10] and Irving [14] (see also [11, Chapter 4]), Feder [5, 6], Subra-
manian [31] and Tan [32] explored structural aspects of sr, and the exploitation of this
structure has led to a number of ecient algorithms for problems concerned with nding
stable matchings in an sr instance. These include an O(m) algorithm for Item 1 (in this
case the succinct certicate is referred to as a stable partition) [32], an O(m) algorithm for
Item 3 [11, Section 4.4.3], an O(nm) algorithm for Item 5 [6] and an algorithm for Item 6
with the same time complexity as that indicated in Item 6 [6].
It is known that 
(m) is a lower bound for each of the problems of nding a stable
matching, and deciding whether a given (man,woman) pair is stable, given an sm instance
[24]. Hence the algorithms for sm (and hence smpf) listed under Items 2, 3 and 5 are
optimal. The same lower bound, together with a discussion in [2], shows that the algorithm
for sm in Item 6 is also optimal. In the context of sm, a stable partition is a stable matching,
and hence the algorithm for sm in Item 1 is also optimal. Since sm is a special case of sr, it
is immediate that the algorithms for sr under Items 1, 2, 3 and 6 are also optimal. Feder
[6] states that O(m) algorithms for the problems in Item 4 (even in the case of sm) and in
Item 5 (even in the case of sr) are unlikely, due to an inherent dependency on transitive
closure. Regarding Item 4 in the context of sr, Feder [5] shows that the problem of nding
an egalitarian stable matching is NP-hard.
The distributive lattice structure for the set of stable matchings in an instance of
sm, which is at the heart of the ecient algorithms listed above for sm, has also been
shown to hold for smt under super-stability [30, 22]. Scott [29] exploited this structure
in order to give several algorithmic results for an smt instance. These include an O(m)
algorithm for Item 3, an O(m2) algorithm for Item 4, an O(m2) algorithm for Item 5, and
an algorithm for Item 6, whose complexity is as follows: after O(m2) pre-processing time,
each super-stable matching can be output in O(m) time.
Until now it has remained open to extend the algorithms listed under Items 1-6 to the
smp or smpf cases, to extend the algorithms listed under Items 1, 3 and 4 to the smf
case, and to extend the algorithms in Items 1-3 and 5-6 to the srf, srp or srpf cases. In
particular, the algorithms under Items 3-6 for smpf improve those of Scott [29] for smt.
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Organisation of the paper
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we give some preliminary
denitions of notation and terminology used throughout this paper, including formal def-
initions of sr, sm and their variants. In Section 3, we present the reduction from an srpf
instance to an srf instance. The reduction from srf to srt is presented in Section 4.
Next, we present the reduction from srf to 2-sat in Section 5. A number of algorithmic
consequences of the reductions in Sections 3 and 5 are given in Section 6. Finally, Section
7 contains some concluding remarks and open problems.
2 Preliminaries
An instance I of sr comprises a pair hA;i, where A = fa1; a2; : : : ; ang is a set of agents,
and  is a set of linear orders over subsets of A, dened as follows. Each ai 2 A has a
non-empty acceptable set of agents Ai  Anfaig. We assume that the acceptable sets are
consistent, i.e. aj 2 Ai if and only if ai 2 Aj . We also assume that  = fai : ai 2 Ag,
where ai is a strict linear order over the agents in Ai, referred to as ai's preference list.
If aj ai ak for two agents aj ; ak 2 A, we say that ai prefers aj to ak. Given ai 2 A, if
Ai = Anfaig then we refer to ai's preference list as complete, otherwise it is incomplete.
Dene the underlying graph of I to be an undirected graph G = (A;E), where E =
ffai; ajg : ai 2 A ^ aj 2 Aig. Henceforth we let m = jEj (so that m equals half the total
length of the preference lists in I). A matching M in I is dened to be a matching in
G; hence M comprises mutually acceptable pairs of agents. If fai; ajg 2 M , we dene
M(ai) = aj . A pair fai; ajg 2 EnM blocks M , or forms a blocking pair of M , if ai is
ummatched in M or prefers aj to M(ai), and similarly aj is unmatched in M or prefers
ai to M(aj). A matching is stable if it admits no blocking pair.
An instance I of srp is dened analogously to the sr case, with the distinction being
that ai is a strict partial order over Ai, for each ai 2 A, referred to as ai's preference
poset. For any ai 2 A, and for any distinct aj ; ak 2 Ai, if aj 6ai ak and ak 6ai aj, then
we say that ai is indierent between aj and ak, denoted by aj ai ak. Dene the relation
ai = ai [ ai . Then I is an instance of srt if ai is a preorder (i.e. a reexive and
transitive relation) for each ai 2 A. (That is, each preference poset can be represented in
terms of a preference list with ties, since the \is indierent between" relation is transitive.)
Throughout this paper, for the purposes of algorithmic complexity arguments, we assume
that, in order to represent an instance of srp, each partial order ai is given in terms of
the adjacency lists of a digraph that represents the transitive reduction of ai as given by
a Hasse diagram.
The restriction sm of sr arises when G is bipartite. The denitions of the variants smp
and smt of sm are analogous to srp and srt respectively.
An instance I of srpf comprises a triple hA;; F i, where A and  are as dened for
the srp case, and F  E. A pair of agents fai; ajg 2 EnM is said to block M , or to be a
blocking pair of M , if either ai is unmatched or aj ai M(ai), and either aj is unmatched
or ai aj M(aj). A matching M in I is super-stable if (i) M \ F = ;, and (ii) M admits
no blocking pair. If M is a super-stable matching in I and fai; ajg 2 M , then fai; ajg is a
super-stable pair, and aj is a super-stable partner of ai. The extensions of the denitions
of sr, srt, sm, smp and smt to include the possibility of forbidden pairs in an instance are
analogous; these problems are denoted by srf, srtf, smf, smpf and smtf respectively.
In instances of srf or smf, we shorten the term super-stable to stable.
Given an srpf instance I = hA;; F i, and agents ai 2 A and aj 2 Ai, we dene
rankai (aj) = 1 + jfak 2 Ai : ak ai ajgj. For a matching M in I, dene AM  A to be
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the set of agents who are matched in M . Let M be a super-stable matching in I and dene
r(M) = maxai2AM rankai (M(ai)). Then M is a minimum regret super-stable matching
if r(M) is minimum over all super-stable matchings in I. We now suppose that weights
are dened on the edges of the underlying graph of I. That is, suppose that, for each
ai 2 A, wtai : Ai  ! R is a given function. Dene w(M) =
P
ai2AM
wtai (M(ai)).
Then M is an optimal super-stable matching if w(M) is minimum over all super-stable
matchings in I. In the case that wtai (aj) = rankai (aj) for each ai 2 A and aj 2 Ai, we
refer to M as an egalitarian super-stable matching.
3 Reduction from srpf under super-stability to srf
Let I = hA;; F i be an instance of srpf. In this section we show how to form an instance
J = hA;0; F 0i of srf such that the super-stable matchings in I are in 1-1 correspondence
with the stable matchings in J . Firstly let 00 be formed by creating an arbitrary linear
extension of each preference poset in . This may be carried out in O(m) time using a
topological sorting algorithm. We create an sr instance K = hA;00i by ignoring the set
F of forbidden pairs. If K is unsolvable then so is I by Proposition 1.1, so we may set
0 = 00 and F 0 = ;. Hence assume that K is solvable and calculate the stable pairs of
K in O(nm) time [6] (O(m) time if I is an instance of smpf [9]). Given any ai 2 A, let
Si denote the set of stable partners of ai in K. Clearly by Proposition 1.1, any super-
stable partner of ai belongs to Si. The following lemma restricts the potential super-stable
partners of ai in Si.
Lemma 3.1. Let the srpf instance I = hA;; F i and the sr instance K = hA;00i be as
dened above, and let ai 2 A. Suppose that aj; ak 2 Si, where aj ai ak and aj 00ai ak.
Then aj cannot be a super-stable partner of ai in I.
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Proof. Suppose that M is a super-stable matching in I containing fai; ajg. Then M is
stable in K by Proposition 1.1. Also by assumption there exists a matching M 0 containing
fai; akg that is stable in K. Since aj = M(ai) 00ai M 0(ai) = ak, it follows by [11, Lemma
4.3.9] that ai = M
0(ak) 00ak M(ak). Hence in I, ai ak M(ak). Also by assumption,
ak ai M(ai). Hence fai; akg blocks M in I, a contradiction.
We use Lemma 3.1 as the basis of a modied topological sorting algorithm that creates
a second linear extension of each preference poset in , in order to form an instance
J = hA;0; F 0i of srf. This algorithm is shown in Figure 1 as Algorithm Linear-ext.
Intuitively, for any agents ai; aj ; ak 2 A, if aj is a super-stable partner of ai in I and
ak ai aj, then the algorithm resolves the indierence in J such that ak 0ai aj .
Let ai 2 A. As mentioned in Section 2, we assume that ai is represented in I by the
adjacency lists of a digraph Di corresponding to the transitive reduction of ai . Algorithm
Linear-ext creates an ordered list Li that represents the constructed linear extension 0ai
of ai . Initially each agent aj 2 Ai is set as marked or unmarked according as aj belongs
to Si or not. A marked agent can subsequently become unmarked, but not vice versa.
Also we maintain a counter c(aj) for each agent aj 2 Ai; initially c(aj) is set to be the
indegree of aj in Di. A dequeue of agents Q is maintained, containing source vertices (i.e.
agents aj 2 Ai such that c(aj) = 0). Initially each source vertex is added to Q at the front
or rear according to the cases shown in the add-to-Q subroutine. During the execution
of Algorithm Linear-ext, the following two invariants hold: (i) ai is indierent among all
agents in Q, and (ii) either all agents in Q are unmarked, or a single agent ak at the rear
of Q is marked, where ak is the worst agent in Q \ Si according to ai's preferences in K.
2In the case that I is an instance of smtf, this result corresponds to Lemma 6.2.2 of [29].
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Linear-ext(agent ai) {
Q := 〈〉;
Li := 〈〉;
for (each agent aj ∈ Ai in arbitrary order) {
if (aj ∈ Si)
set aj to be marked;
else
set aj to be unmarked;
c(aj) := indegree(aj);
if (c(aj) = 0)
add-to-Q(aj);
}
while (Q 6= 〈〉) {
remove an agent aj from the front of Q;
append aj to Li;
for (each agent ak adjacent from aj in Di) {
c(ak) := c(ak)− 1;
if (c(ak) = 0)
add-to-Q(ak);
}
}
}
add-to-Q(aj) {
if (aj is marked)
if (no marked agent is at the rear of Q)
add aj to the rear of Q;
else if (some marked ak is at the rear of Q)
if (ak ≺′′ai aj) {
set ak as unmarked;
add aj to the rear of Q; }
else
set aj as unmarked;
add aj to the front of Q; }
else
add aj to the front of Q;
}
Figure 1: Algorithm Linear-ext for creating a linear extension 0ai of ai .
With a suitable choice of data structures (including ranking arrays [11, Section 1.2.4],
which may be constructed from the preference lists in K using O(m) time, allowing one
to decide in O(1) time whether ak 00ai aj), it is straightforward to verify that Algorithm
Linear-ext may be implemented to run in O(m) overall time. At the termination of the
algorithm's execution for the given agent ai, let Ci denote the set of marked agents. Also,
let 0= f0ai : ai 2 Ag.
The following lemma indicates the signicance of marked agents relative to the linear
orders constructed by Algorithm Linear-ext.
Lemma 3.2. Let the srpf instance I = hA;; F i and the set of linear orders 0 be as
dened above, and let ai 2 A. Then:
(i) if aj =2 Ci then aj cannot be a super-stable partner of ai in I;
(ii) if aj 2 Ci and ak ai aj, then ak 0ai aj.
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Proof. (i). Suppose aj =2 Ci. If aj =2 Si then aj cannot be a super-stable partner of ai in
I by Proposition 1.1. Hence suppose that aj 2 Si, so that aj was marked when the rst
for loop considered aj. Then aj became unmarked subsequently during the algorithm's
execution. This occurred during some call to the add-to-Q subroutine { just before this
call returns, there is some marked agent ak in Q such that aj 00ai ak. Now aj ai ak, for
otherwise aj and ak cannot both be source vertices. The result follows by Lemma 3.1.
(ii). As aj is marked at the termination of the algorithm's execution, aj must have
been added to the rear of Q when it became a source vertex. Furthermore, aj must remain
at the rear of Q until it is removed from Q, for otherwise aj would become unmarked.
In particular, when aj is removed from Q, it is the only source vertex. Since ak ai aj ,
it follows that ak must be (added to and) removed from Q before aj is removed from Q.
Hence by construction of 0ai , it follows that ak 0ai aj .
Now dene the sr instance J 0 = hA;0i. The next step is to calculate the stable
pairs of J 0 in O(nm) time [6] (O(m) time if I is an instance of smpf [9]). Given any
agent ai 2 A, let Ti denote the set of stable partners of ai in J 0, and let Fi = TinCi. Let
F 0 =
S
ai2A
ffai; ajg : aj 2 Fig [ F be the set of forbidden pairs in J . Finally, dene
the srf instance J = hA;0; F 0i. The following result indicates the relationship between
super-stable matchings in I and stable matchings in J .
Theorem 3.3. Given an srpf instance I = hA;; F i, we may construct in O(nm) time
an srf instance J = hA;0; F 0i as dened above. Moreover, if M is a matching in I, then
M is super-stable in I if and only if M is stable in J . If I is an instance of smpf then J
is an instance of smf, and may be constructed in O(m) time.
Proof. Suppose that M is super-stable in I. Then M\F = ;. Now let fai; ajg 2 M . Then
aj 2 Ci by Lemma 3.2(i). Hence M \ F 0 = ;. Moreover M is stable in J by Proposition
1.1.
Conversely suppose that M is stable in J . Then M \F = ;. Now suppose that fai; ajg
is a blocking pair of M in I. If ai is matched in M and aj ai M(ai), then aj 0ai M(ai),
since 0ai is a linear extension of ai . Now suppose that aj ai M(ai). Since M \F 0 = ;,
it follows that M(ai) 2 Ci. Hence by Lemma 3.2(ii), it follows that aj 0ai M(ai). By a
similar argument it follows that aj is unmatched in M or ai 0aj M(aj). Hence fai; ajg
blocks M in J , a contradiction. Thus M is super-stable in I.
Finally we remark that the last sentence in the statement of the theorem is an imme-
diate consequence of the fact that the reduction preserves bipartiteness.
Consequences of the reduction for smpf
For the case that I is an instance of smpf, the following theorem presents a number of
algorithmic results that hold as a consequence of analogous results in the context of smf
[2] and Theorem 3.3.
Theorem 3.4. Let I be an instance of smpf. Then:
(i) There is an O(m) algorithm that nds a super-stable matching in I or reports that
none exists. (If I is an instance of smt, see also [15, 21].)
(ii) There is an O(m) algorithm for nding all the super-stable pairs in I.
(iii) There is an algorithm for listing all the super-stable matchings in I: the rst super-
stable matching can be output in O(m) time, and each subsequent super-stable match-
ing can be output in O(n) time.
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4 Reduction from srf to srt under super-stability
In this section we consider a counterpart to the reduction presented in Section 3. Theorem
3.3 shows in particular that the problem of nding a super-stable matching if one exists,
given an instance I of srt, may be reduced in O(nm) time to the problem of nding a
stable matching if one exists, given an instance J of srf. It turns out that, by modifying
a reduction of Cechlarova and Fleiner [1, Theorem 2.1], we may formulate a reduction in
the opposite direction, as the following result indicates.
Theorem 4.1. Given an instance I of srf, we may construct in O(m) time an instance
J of srt such that a super-stable matching in J can be derived in O(m) time from a stable
matching in I, and vice versa.
Proof. Let I = hA;; F i be an instance of srf. We form an instance J = hA0;0i of srt
as follows. Initially let A0 = A and 0=. Suppose that
F = ffaik ; ajkg : ik < jk ^ 1  k  rg:
For each k (1  k  r), add the new agents wk; xk; yk; zk to A0, replace ajk by wk in 0aik ,
and replace aik by zk in 0ajk . The preference lists in 
0 for the newly-introduced agents
in A0 are as follows:
wk : zk (xk aik) xk : wk yk
yk : xk zk zk : yk (wk ajk)
In a given preference list, agents are listed from left to right in decreasing order of prefer-
ence, and agents within brackets are tied.
Suppose that M is a stable matching in I. Then M \ F = ;. Initially let M 0 = M .
Now let k (1  k  r) be given. Either (i) aik is matched in M and prefers M(aik) to ajk
in I, or (ii) ajk is matched in M and prefers M(ajk) to aik in I, for otherwise faik ; ajkg
blocks M in I. In Case (i), add the pairs fwk; xkg; fyk; zkg to M 0, whilst in Case (ii), add
the pairs fwk; zkg; fxk; ykg to M 0. It may be veried that the matching M 0 so constructed
is a super-stable matching in J .
Conversely suppose that M 0 is a super-stable matching in J . We rstly note that, for
each k (1  k  r), faik ; wkg =2 M 0, for otherwise fwk; xkg blocks M 0 in J , and similarly
fajk ; zkg =2 M 0, for otherwise fwk; zkg blocks M 0 in J . Let G = (A;E) be the underlying
graph of I, and let M = M 0\E. Clearly M \F = ;. Let fai; ajg 2 EnM . If fai; ajg =2 F ,
then clearly this pair cannot block M in I, by the super-stability of M 0 in J . Now suppose
that fai; ajg 2 F . Without loss of generality assume that fai; ajg = faik ; ajkg for some k
(1  k  r). Suppose that aik is unmatched in M or prefers ajk to M(aik) in I. Then
since faik ; wkg =2 M 0, it follows that aik is unmatched in M 0 or prefers wk to M 0(aik) in J .
Hence by the super-stability of M 0 in J , it follows that fwk; zkg 2 M 0, so that in turn, ajk
is matched in M 0 and prefers M 0(ajk) to zk. As previously observed, fajk ;M 0(ajk)g 2 M ,
so that faik ; ajkg does not block M in I. Hence M is stable in I.
The following observation is an immediate consequence of the above reduction and
Algorithm srt-super [17].
Corollary 4.2. There is an O(m) algorithm that nds a stable matching or reports that
none exists, given an instance of srf.
We remark that if I is an instance of smf then J is an instance of smt, since the above
reduction preserves bipartiteness.
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5 Reduction from srf to 2-sat
In this section, we show how to modify the constructions of Feder [5, 6] in order to obtain
a reduction from srf to 2-sat. We rst review the relationship between the set of all
stable matchings for an instance I of sr and the so-called rotations for that instance.
Irving's algorithm for sr [13, 11] consists of two phases. The rst phase is analogous to
an extended form of the classical Gale-Shapley algorithm for sm [8]; it involves a sequence
of \proposals" from one agent ai to the rst agent aj on his list, each such proposal
resulting in the deletion of all successors of ai from aj's list. (Here, and subsequently,
the deletion of ak from the list of aj implies the deletion of aj from the list of ak.) On
termination of this phase, the (reduced) preference lists form an example of what is called
a stable table [11, p.169]; among the properties of such a table are that all rst entries are
distinct, and that aj is rst in ai's list if and only if ai is last in that of aj .
A rotation exposed in a stable table T is a sequence (ai0 ; aj0); : : : ; (air 1 ; ajr 1) of pairs
such that ajk is rst and ajk+1 second in aik 's list in T , for each k (0  k  r   1),
where arithmetic with respect to rotations is taken modulo r. Elimination of the rotation
involves deleting all successors of aik 1 from the list of ajk , for each k (0  k  r   1). A
key result is that, provided no list becomes empty, the elimination of an exposed rotation
from a stable table gives another (smaller) stable table. Phase 2 of the algorithm consists
of the successive elimination of rotations from the current stable table until either some
list becomes empty as a result, in which case no stable matching exists, or all lists that
were non-empty after phase 1 are reduced to a single entry, in which case these entries
constitute a stable matching. In what follows of this section, we assume that I is solvable,
i.e. I admits a stable matching. At the termination of phase 1, we may identify the xed
pairs of I { these are the stable pairs that belong to every stable matching in I. A pair
fai; ajg is a xed pair if and only if ai's list contains only aj at the termination of phase
1 [11, Lemma 4.4.1].
Suppose that  = (ai0 ; aj0); : : : ; (air 1 ; ajr 1) is a rotation that is exposed in some stable
table. The syntactic dual of  is  = (aj1 ; ai0); : : : ; (aj0 ; air 1). If there is some sequence
of rotations that leads to a stable table in which  is exposed, then  is also a rotation; in
this case  and  are called non-singular rotations, and are duals of each other, otherwise
 is singular. (Hence the syntactic dual of a singular rotation is not actually a rotation at
all.) A partial order  is dened on the set of rotations as follows:    if and only if 
must be eliminated to give a stable table in which  is exposed. The rotations under 
form the rotation poset for I. A subset S of this poset is closed if, whenever  is in S, so
also is every rotation  such that   . Also S is complete if S contains every singular
rotation of I, together with exactly one of each dual pair of non-singular rotations. The
following theorem encapsulates the relationship between the rotation poset and the set of
all stable matchings in I.
Theorem 5.1 ([10, 11]). Let I be a solvable sr instance. There is a 1-1 correspondence
between the stable matchings in I and the complete closed subsets of the rotation poset of
I.
The so-called extended rotation poset RI for I contains all the rotations together with
the syntactic duals of the singular rotations, and restricting this structure by excluding
these latter elements gives the actual rotation poset. We can nd, in O(m) time, a directed
graph RI that represents R

I , in the sense that the transitive closure of RI is isomorphic
to RI (see [11, Section 4.4.1]). The digraph RI is constructed by scanning each preference
list in turn, adding a sequence of edges derived from the rotations represented in that list
(see [11, Section 4.4.1]). As a consequence, the explicit width of RI is at most n, meaning
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that we can nd a set of at most n vertex-disjoint paths in RI that cover all the vertices
{ one such path arises from each preference list.
The digraph RI turns out to be equivalent to the implication digraph of an instance
J of acyclic 2-sat. In J , each variable and its negation correspond to a rotation and its
syntactic dual. The clauses of J are of the form (_ ) for any pair of rotations such that
(; ) is an edge in RI (which implies that  precedes  in R

I). Because a singular rotation
precedes its syntactic dual in RI , the singular rotations are precisely the trivial variables in
J { i.e., those that are true in every satisfying truth assignment. Hence the true variables
in any satisfying truth assignment for J correspond to a complete closed set of rotations
in I. The converse is also true, so by Theorem 5.1 there is a 1-1 correspondence between
satisfying truth assignments for J and stable matchings in I.
The implication digraph D of J has a vertex for each literal and a directed edge (; )
if ( _ ) is a clause in J . So, in fact, D is structurally identical to RI , except that the
direction of every edge is reversed.
Feder [6] has established that we can construct in O(nm) time a representation of
the transitive closure D of D, which enables us to test in O(1) time whether a given
edge is in D or not. This allows the singular rotations to be identied, since a rotation
 is singular if and only if (; ) 2 D. In turn, this allows the stable pairs of I to be
found, since these are precisely the (disjoint) union of the xed pairs and the pairs that
are in some non-singular rotation [11, Lemma 4.4.1]. Furthermore, Feder [6] shows that
the stable matchings of I may be listed eciently by considering the digraph D. The
following result gives two consequences that arise from the discussion so far.
Theorem 5.2 ([6]). Let I be an instance of sr and let J be the instance of 2-sat as
described above. Then:
(i) The stable pairs for I can be found in O(nm) time.
(ii) The satisfying truth assignments for J , and therefore the stable matchings for I, can
be listed in O(n) time per solution, after O(m) pre-processing time.
Now let K = hA;; F i be an instance of srf, and let I = hA;i be the instance of
sr obtained from K by ignoring the forbidden pairs in F . We observe rst that forbidden
pairs in F that are not stable pairs of I have no eect and can be ignored. Also if any
pair in F is a xed pair of I, clearly K is unsolvable. Hence we assume that no pair in
F is a xed pair of I. As described above, let D be the implication digraph of the 2-sat
instance representing I. We show how to extend D so as to obtain a reduction from K to
an instance J of 2-sat. Corresponding to each forbidden pair that is a stable pair of I, we
add one or two additional edges to D, which results in two of the variables in the 2-sat
instance becoming equivalent.
Suppose the forbidden pair is fai; ajg. Note that, for every stable pair fai; ajg of I
that is not a xed pair of I, either (ai; aj) or (aj ; ai) is in a rotation [11, Lemma 4.4.1]. In
fact, the stable pair (ai; aj) is in a rotation if and only if ai is not the best stable partner of
aj (or, equivalently, aj is not the worst stable partner of ai). Let us suppose that (ai; aj)
belongs to a rotation  of I.
Case (i). Suppose that aj is the rst stable partner (according to ai) of ai in I. Note
that, in this case, the pair (aj ; ai) is not in a rotation of I. Thus to avoid the presence of
the pair fai; ajg in any stable matching, we have to ensure that  (and any predecessor
rotation) is eliminated, or, in the 2-sat context, that variable  is true. We do this by
adding the edge (; ) to the implication digraph D.
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Case (ii). Suppose that ak is the stable partner of ai in I that immediately precedes aj
(according to ai), and that (ai; ak) 2  in I. Then to avoid the presence of the pair
fai; ajg in any stable matching, we have to ensure that if  is eliminated then so is , or,
in the 2-sat context, that variable  is true if  is true. We do this by adding the edge
(; ) to the implication digraph, thereby making variables  and  equivalent {  is true
if and only if  is true. Note also that, since aj is not the best stable partner of ai, the
pair (aj ; ai) must belong to a rotation, so we must also carry out the corresponding action
for this pair.
Let D be the implication digraph that arises once this process has been carried out
for each pair in F . By reversing the edge directions in D, we obtain a digraph RK that
may be viewed as the analogue of RI for K. The transitive closure R

K of RK may also be
viewed as the analogue of RI for K, but in general R

K contains cycles and therefore does
not correspond to a poset. Nevertheless, we may dene a complete set of rotations S in
I to be closed in RK if, whenever  2 S, so also is every rotation  such that (; ) is an
edge of RK . The following result is an immediate consequence of the construction of D.
Theorem 5.3. Given an instance K = hA;; F i of srf, suppose that the instance I =
hA;i of sr is solvable, and no pair in F is a xed pair of I. Then there is a 1-1
correspondence between the stable matchings in K and the complete subsets of the rotation
poset of I that are closed in RK .
3
Proof. Let M be a stable matching in K. By Theorem 5.1, M corresponds to a complete
closed subset Z of rotations in I. As M \ F = ;, it is straightforward to verify that, for
any rotation  identied by Case (i) above,  2 Z , and for any rotations  and  identied
by Case (ii) above, if  2 Z then  2 Z. Hence Z is closed in RK .
Conversely suppose that Z is a complete subset of the rotation poset of I that is closed
in RK . Then Z is closed in I, so that Z corresponds to a stable matching M in I by
Theorem 5.1. For any rotation  identied by Case (i) above,  2 Z, for otherwise  2 Z
as Z is complete, and hence  2 Z as Z is closed in RK , a contradiction. Similarly for
any rotations  and  identied by Case (ii) above, if  2 Z then  2 Z, as Z is closed in
RK . Hence M \ F = ;, so that M is stable in K.
The implication digraph D can be made acyclic (in O(m) time) using a strong com-
ponents algorithm. That is, each strongly connected component Ci is replaced by a single
vertex vi, and each edge between two vertices in distinct strongly connected components
is replaced by an edge between the two corresponding representative vertices. Let J be
the 2-sat instance represented by the resulting implication digraph D 0. Clearly D0 still
has explicit width at most n, since adding additional edges to D as described in Cases (i)
and (ii) above, and coalescing vertices during the strong components algorithm, cannot
increase the explicit width. We thus obtain the following result, using Theorem 5.3, to-
gether with the the fact that the true variables in any satisfying truth assignment for J
correspond to a complete set of rotations in I that are closed in RK .
Theorem 5.4. Given an instance K = hA;; F i of srf, suppose that the instance
I = hA;i of sr is solvable, and no pair in F is a xed pair of I. Then we may construct
in O(nm) time an instance J of 2-sat, such that the implication digraph of J has explicit
width at most n, and the stable matchings for K are in 1-1 correspondence with the sat-
isfying truth assignments for J . If K is an instance of smf then J may be constructed in
O(m) time.
3In the case that K is an instance of smf, this result corresponds to Theorem 6 of [2].
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6 Further algorithmic results for srpf and smpf
In this section we present a number of algorithmic results for srpf and smpf that follow
as a consequence of the reductions given in Sections 3 and 5, and Theorems 3.3, 5.3 and
5.4 in particular. These results add to those already given by Theorem 3.4 for smpf.
Theorem 6.1. Let I be an instance of srpf. Then:
(i) There is a succinct certicate, using O(m) space, for the unsolvability of I, which
may be computed in O(nm) time (O(m) time if I is an instance of smpf).
(ii) There is an O(nm) algorithm that nds a super-stable matching in I or reports that
none exists.
(iii) There is an O(nm) algorithm for nding all the super-stable pairs in I.
(iv) There is an algorithm for generating all the super-stable matchings in I: the rst
stable matching can be output in O(nm) time, and each subsequent stable matching
can be output in O(n) time.
Proof. (i). Let I = hA;; F i be an instance of srpf. Let K = hA;0; F 0i be the instance of
srf obtained from I as in Section 3, and let I 0 = hA;0i be the instance of sr obtained from
K by ignoring the pairs in F . Firstly, we note that if I 0 is unsolvable, the characterisation
of Tan [32] gives a succinct O(n) certicate for the unsolvability of I in O(nm) time, by
Theorem 3.3 (clearly this case cannot occur if I is an instance of smpf). Now suppose that
I 0 is solvable. If a pair in F is a xed pair of I 0, then a succinct O(m) certicate of this is
the set of preference lists after phase 1 of Irving's algorithm (which has O(m) complexity)
applied to I 0. Hence suppose that no pair in F is a xed pair of I 0. Let J be the instance
of 2-sat obtained from K as in Section 5. The unsolvability of J is characterised by a
cycle, using O(m) space, in the implication digraph D of J , involving a variable  and its
negation . Such a cycle would be discovered by the strong components algorithm when
attempting to make D acyclic following the addition of the vertices and edges to D. The
result then follows by Theorems 3.3 and 5.4.
(ii). This result follows by the discussion in Case (i), together with the O(m) algorithm
for nding a satisfying truth assignment or reporting that none exists, given an instance
of 2-sat [3], followed by Theorems 3.3 and 5.4.
(iii). This is an immediate consequence of Theorems 3.3 and 5.4, together with [6,
Theorem 6.2].
(iv). This is an immediate consequence of Theorems 3.3 and 5.4, together with [6,
Theorem 8.1].
In the remainder of this section we consider optimal, egalitarian and minimum regret
super-stable matchings in an srpf instance I = hA;; F i. Let K = hA;0; F 0i be the
instance of srf obtained from I as in Section 3. Let J be the instance of 2-sat obtained
from K as in Section 5. As an aside, we rstly remark that, for any super-stable pair
fai; ajg in I, it follows from the construction of K that
rank0ai
(aj) = rankai (aj) + jfak 2 Ainfajg : ak ai ajgj:
Optimal and egalitarian super-stable matchings
For each of the problems of computing an optimal and egalitarian super-stable matching
in I, we dene a weight function wt0ai
in K for each ai 2 A. That is, for each ai 2 A and
aj 2 Ai, in the optimal case, dene wt0ai (aj) = wtai (aj), and in the egalitarian case,
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dene wt0ai
(aj) = rankai (aj). Then an optimal stable matching in K is an optimal
super-stable matching in I. It also follows that w(M) = w0(M). Hence, and by
Theorems 3.3, 5.4 and [6, Theorem 7.2], the following result holds concerning optimal and
egalitarian super-stable matchings in the context of smpf.
Theorem 6.2. Let I be an instance of smpf, and suppose that, for each ai 2 A, wtai :
Ai  ! R is a given function. Then an optimal super-stable matching in I of weight W
can be found in O(m
p
W ) time if W = O((m= log2 m)2), and in O(nm log W ) time for
arbitrary W . The egalitarian case has W  m and hence can be solved in O(m1:5) time. 4
Minimum regret super-stable matchings
We next give an algorithm for nding a minimum regret super-stable matching in an
instance I of srpf. Our algorithm is of O(nm) complexity; this improves to O(m) if I is
an instance of smpf. In what follows we assume that K is solvable.
Let I 0 = hA;0i be the instance of sr obtained from K by ignoring the pairs in F .
Recall from Theorems 3.3 and 5.3 that there is a 1-1 correspondence between the super-
stable matchings in I and the complete subsets of the rotation poset of I 0 that are closed
in RK . We will create such a subset Z that corresponds to a minimum regret super-stable
matching M in I. We rstly note that Z must contain the singular rotations of I 0. Recall
that the rotations in I 0 may be found in O(m) time [11], and identied as singular or dual
in O(nm) time [6]. If I is an instance of smpf then this latter step is not required, since
there are no singular rotations in I 0.
To facilitate the choice of non-singular rotations, we rstly compute the set of super-
stable pairs in I. By Theorems 6.1 and 3.4, this step may be carried out in O(nm)
time (O(m) time if I is an instance if smpf). In what follows we assume there is at
least one super-stable pair in I that is not a xed pair of I, for otherwise the com-
putation of a minimum regret super-stable matching in I is trivial. Given a rotation
 = (ai0 ; aj0); : : : ; (air 1 ; ajr 1) in I
0, dene
rank() = max

f0g [

rankajk
(aik) :
0  k  r   1 ^
faik ; ajkg is a super-stable pair in I

:
The idea of the algorithm is to pick a non-singular rotation  for which rank() = R,
where R is as large as possible. We then try to eliminate  { if this is not possible then, as
we will show, r(M)  R for any super-stable matching M in I. Any rotation  that does
not contain a super-stable pair does not lead to the same condition on r(M)  R, which
is why rank() is dened to be 0 for such a rotation. It is straightforward to verify that
rank(), for each rotation  in I
0, may be found in O(m) overall time using a scan of the
agents' preference lists in I 0. The following lemma is crucial to our approach for nding a
minimum regret super-stable matching in I.
Lemma 6.3. Let K and I 0 be as dened above. Let  be a non-singular rotation in I 0
such that rank() = R  1. Let Z be a complete subset of rotations in I 0 that is closed in
RK such that  =2 Z. Let M be the stable matching in K corresponding to Z, by Theorem
5.3. Then r(M)  R.
Proof. Let  = (ai0 ; aj0); : : : ; (air 1 ; ajr 1). As R  1, it follows that rankajk (aik) = R
for some k (0  k  r   1) where faik ; ajkg is a super-stable pair in I. Since  =2 Z,
4In order to construct an optimal or egalitarian stable matching, Feder [6] assumes that wt′
ai
is a
nondecreasing function for each ai ∈ A. However this assumption is made purely from a practical point of
view, and the algorithm does not, in fact, require it.
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it follows from the completeness of Z that  2 Z. But  moves ajk down to aik in I 0,
so that either M(ajk) = aik or aik 0ajk M(ajk). Hence in I, either (a) M(ajk) = aik ,
or (b) aik ajk M(ajk), or (c) aik ajk M(ajk) by construction of K (i.e. since 0ajk is
a linear extension of ajk ). In Cases (a) and (b), it follows that rankajk (M(ajk))  R
as required. In Case (c), we obtain a contradiction to the stability of M in K, since
fajk ;M(ajk)g 2 F 0 by construction of K, as faik ; ajkg is a super-stable pair in I.
The above observation gives rise to the following denition. Let Z be a complete
subset of rotations in I 0 that is closed in RK . Dene
r(Z) = maxfrank() :  is a rotation in I 0 ^  =2 Zg:
Then Z is said to be of minimum regret if r(Z) is minimum over all complete subsets
of rotations in I 0 that are closed in RK . The following lemma establishes a link between
such a subset of rotations and a minimum regret super-stable matching in I.
Lemma 6.4. Let K and I 0 be as dened above. Let Z be a minimum regret complete
subset of rotations in I 0 that is closed in RK . Then Z corresponds to a minimum regret
super-stable matching M in I.
Proof. By Theorems 5.3 and 3.3, Z corresponds to a super-stable matching M in I.
Suppose there exists a super-stable matching M 0 in I such that r(M
0) < r(M) = R.
By Theorems 3.3 and 5.3, let Z 0 be the complete subset of rotations in I 0 that is closed
in RK that corresponds to M
0. As r(M) = R  1, there exists some fai; ajg 2 M such
that rankaj (ai) = R. Now fai; ajg =2 M 0, so fai; ajg is not a xed pair of I 0. Hence by
[11, Lemma 4.4.1], either (i) (ai; aj) 2  or (ii) (aj ; ai) 2 , for some rotation  in I 0. We
consider these two cases separately.
Case (i). As (ai; aj) 2  and fai; ajg is a super-stable pair in I, it follows that
rank()  R. Now  =2 Z, since fai; ajg 2 M . Hence r(Z)  R. Thus by the choice
of Z, it follows that r(Z 0)  R. Hence there is a rotation  in I 0 such that  =2 Z 0 and
rank()  R. It follows by Lemma 6.3 that r(M 0)  R, a contradiction.
Case (ii). Suppose for a contradiction that  2 Z 0. Then in K, it follows that
ai 0aj M 0(aj). Hence in I, either (a) ai aj M 0(aj), or (b) ai aj M 0(aj) by construction
of K. In Case (a) it follows that rankaj (M
0(aj)) > R, a contradiction. In Case (b) we
also obtain a contradiction, since faj ;M 0(aj)g 2 F 0 by construction of K, as fai; ajg is a
super-stable pair in I. Hence  =2 Z 0. It follows that  2 Z 0. Rotation  moves ai down
to aj in I
0. Hence as fai; ajg =2 M 0, it follows that (ai; aj) 2  for some  2 Z 0. The
remainder of this case is similar to the proof of Case (i).
Dene the cost of a literal in J to be the rank of the corresponding rotation. By Lemma
6.4 and Theorem 5.4, it follows that nding a minimum regret super-stable matching in
I is equivalent to nding a satisfying truth assignment in J that minimises the maximum
cost of a false literal. It is straightforward to nd such an assignment in J in O(m) time
using the following modication of the algorithm of [3].
Let D be the implication digraph corresponding to J . Initially we create a partial truth
assignment by setting to true the literals in D corresponding to the singular rotations of
I 0. We then create 2n buckets B0; B1; : : : ; B2n 1, each of which is initially empty and
unmarked. Each non-singular rotation  is placed in the bucket corresponding to its rank
{ we denote this bucket by B(). We also include a pointer from  to its position in B().
If there is a directed path from  to  in D, we mark B(). Intuitively, a bucket BR is
marked if it contains a rotation  that cannot be eliminated { in this case r(M)  R for
any stable matching M in I by Lemma 6.3.
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Let R be the maximum integer such that bucket BR is non-empty. If BR is marked then
we extend the current partial truth assignment arbitrarily to a satisfying truth assignment
using the algorithm of [3] and terminate. This assignment corresponds to a super-stable
matching M in I such that r(M) = R. Otherwise pick a rotation  from BR. Set the
literal in D corresponding to  to be true, remove  from BR and mark B(). For any
rotation  reachable from  by a directed path in D, set the literal in D corresponding to
 to be true and mark B(). (Note that there cannot be a path from  to  in D, for this
would imply a path from  to , as there is a path from  to  by construction of D and
by [11, Lemma 4.3.7(ii)], a contradiction.) We then repeat the steps in this paragraph.
We remark that R  1 upon termination of the above algorithm. For, by our earlier
assumption, there exists a pair fai; ajg 2 M that is not a xed pair of I. Hence by [11,
Lemma 4.4.1], either (i) (ai; aj) 2  or (ii) (aj ; ai) 2 , for some rotation  in I 0. It
follows that  2 Z, where Z is the complete subset of rotations in I 0 that is closed in
RK corresponding M , by Theorems 3.3 and 5.3. Hence when the algorithm chooses ,
bucket B() will be marked. But rank()  1, since fai; ajg is a super-stable pair in I.
It follows that R  1 as required.
With a suitable choice of data structures the algorithm described above can be im-
plemented to run in O(m) time, and therefore we may summarise the discussion of this
section by the following theorem.
Theorem 6.5. Let I be a solvable instance of srpf. Then we may nd a minimum regret
super-stable matching in I in O(nm) time. If I is an instance of smpf then this complexity
improves to O(m) time.
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have presented ecient algorithms for a range of problems concerned
with nding various types of stable matchings, given instances of srpf and smpf. These
include the problems of nding all super-stable pairs, listing all super-stable matchings,
and nding egalitarian and minimum regret super-stable matchings, given an instance of
smt. As mentioned in Section 1, alternative forms of stability have been dened in the
context of smt, and one could also consider the aforementioned problems with respect
to weak stability. However in this setting, the following results are known, given an smt
instance I:
1. The problem of nding a minimum regret weakly stable matching in I is NP-hard
[23] and not approximable within 
(n) [12].
2. The problem of nding an egalitarian weakly stable matching in I is NP-hard [23]
and not approximable within 
(n) [12].
3. The problem of deciding whether a given (man,woman) pair (m;w) is a weakly stable
pair in I is NP-complete [23].
4. Given a weakly stable matching M1 in I, there is an O(m) algorithm that nds a
weakly stable matching M2 6= M1 or reports that M1 is the unique weakly stable
matching in I [29].
It remains open as to whether the algorithm in Item 4 can be extended to give an ecient
algorithm for listing all weakly stable matchings in I without repetition. However, it is
known that the problem of deciding whether an instance of smtf admits a weakly stable
matching is NP-complete [29].
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For the remaining stability criterion, it is open as to whether the results of this paper
can be extended to the case of srtf or smtf under strong stability. (Recall from Section
1 that the problem of deciding whether a given smp instance admits a strongly stable
matching is NP-complete.) We note that Feder [4, p.148] conjectures that, for an instance
I of smt, the problem of deciding whether there is a strongly stable matching other than
the man-optimal and woman-optimal strongly stable matchings is NP-complete. However
it is known that there may be more than one man-optimal strongly stable matching in I,
though all such matchings are equivalent up to indierence [22] (a similar remark holds
for woman-optimal strongly stable matchings). Based on this observation, one may dene
a suitable equivalence relation on the set of strongly stable matchings in I, and it is then
possible to check in polynomial time if a given matching belongs to a given equivalence
class [22]. Hence the problem that Feder's conjecture relates to can be expressed as follows:
is there a strongly stable matching M in I, such that M =2 [M0] and M =2 [Mz ], where
[M0] and [Mz ] are the equivalence classes corresponding to any man-optimal and any
woman-optimal strongly matching in I, respectively?
We conclude with a further open problem, which may be specied as follows: given
an instance I = hA;; F i of srf, where I 0 = hA;i is solvable, nd a matching M in
I such that (i) M is stable in I 0, and (ii) jM \ F j is minimum. Is this problem solvable
in polynomial time? We remark that, if I is an instance of smf, the problem may be
solved in O(m1:5) time by considering the weights wtai (aj) = 1 for each fai; ajg 2 E and
wtai (aj) = 0 for each fai; ajg 2 EnF , and then applying Theorem 6.2, where G = (V;E)
is the underlying graph of I. However it also remains to show that the problem can be
solved in O(m) time in the smf case.
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